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11 Introduction
This paper investigates how the interaction between technological and ¯nancial variables
shapes the dynamics of economies populated by heterogeneous agents.
The research on the roles played by ¯nance and technology in determining the ag-
gregate performance of a decentralized economy has a long history in economic analysis.
Schumpeter (1934) was among the ¯rst to acknowledge that ¯nancial investments were as
important as technical advances for long-run economic growth.
More recently, this argument has been employed to explain the spectacular performance
of U.S. economy in the 90's on the basis of the widespread di®usion of information and
communication technologies, and the huge ¯nancial investments that channelled it (see
Levine, 2005; Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes, 2004; Carlin and Mayer, 2003). For
example, Rossi et al. (2001), in line with the earliest work of Schumpeter, have shown that
investment opportunities triggered by the introduction of new production possibilities are
typically not su±cient to foster aggregate growth in the long-run. The e±ciency of the
system in conveying funds toward those opportunities is a crucial factor as well.
Furthermore, on a more short-run scale, diverse strands of research have identi¯ed either
in technological shocks or in the dynamics of ¯nancial variables the main cause of business
cycles. For instance, the \real business cycle" school (see Stadler, 1994, for a survey) has
popularized the view that exogenous technological shocks to total factor productivity were
responsible for °uctuations of main macroeconomic variables.
Conversely, the \¯nancial accelerator" literature has attempted to account for business
cycles on the grounds of ¯rms' ¯nancial status (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1996; Kiy-
otaki and Moore, 1997; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993). In this view, short-run movements
in the main macroeconomic time-series are induced by shocks a®ecting balance sheets of
¯rms and their ability to ¯nance production and investment plans through internal and
external resources.
Albeit providing important insights on how decentralized economies work both in the
long-run and at business cycle frequencies, all contributions discussed so far aim at explain-
ing statistical regularities at a very aggregate level. Any microfoundation of macroeconomic
relations is usually carried over by sticking to the hypothesis of a representative agent fac-
ing an inter-temporal optimization problem. The analysis of cross-sectional properties of
the agents (e.g., their persistent heterogeneity) is almost completely neglected.
Nevertheless, a good deal of resent research in industrial organization has been able to
single out an impressive number of stylised facts concerning the cross-sectional evolution
of ¯rms and productivity. In particular, the micro-dynamics patterns displayed by \real-
world" economies look quite di®erent from the homogeneous one postulated in represen-
2tative agent based models. Indeed, the presence of signi¯cant and persistent asymmetries
among ¯rms in terms of investment, output, employment, productivity levels, etc. { over
the di®erent phases of business cycles, as well as at a longer time spans { emerges as a
distinctive feature of modern economies (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Caballero, Engel,
and Haltiwanger, 1995, 1993; Bartelsman and Doms, 2000).
This empirical evidence raises the question whether the foregoing asymmetries, robustly
and persistently emerging at the micro-economic level, matter for the dynamics of the whole
economy. As argued at more length in Dosi and Orsenigo (1994), a large part of existing
macroeconomics literature, including both the \real business cycle" and the \¯nancial
accelerator" traditions, have made few attempts to investigate these micro-macro linkages
(with the notable exception of Ricardo Caballero and his co-authors, see e.g. Caballero,
Engel, and Haltiwanger (1995)).
In this paper, we make a preliminary step in ¯lling this gap. More speci¯cally, we
explore the extent to which persistent heterogeneity in ¯rms' technology and ¯nancial at-
tributes is able robustly to a®ect the statistical properties of micro- and macro-dynamics.
To this end, we propose an agent-based model where the source of business °uctuations
and long-run growth is rooted in the behaviours of an evolving network of heterogenous
¯rms. We follow a \bottom-up" approach to microfoundation and we analyze the ability
of the model to jointly reproduce micro and macro empirical evidence. In particular, we
are interested in two sets of stylised facts. First, on the macroeconomic side, we attempt
to replicate some standard time-series properties concerning the coupled dynamics of ag-
gregate output, investment and productivity. Second, on the microeconomic side, we are
interested in the statistical properties of the cross-section distributions for some crucial
¯rms' attributes (e.g., growth, productivity, etc.) and their dynamics.
In the model, a key role is played by ¯nancial and technological variables. Due to
information asymmetries in capital markets, ¯rms are prevented from raising equity ex-
ternally. These informational imperfections have two major consequences. First, ¯rms
cannot completely diversify out the risks of bankruptcy inherent their actions. Second,
they must resort to credit markets for external ¯nancing. The impossibility of washing
away completely default risks leads ¯rms to act in a risk-averse manner when setting their
output investment and technological adoption plans. Firms' decisions on production levels
and investment will thus be in°uenced by the level of ¯rm's net worth, which acts as a
bu®er variable toward risk. Technology matters for the evolution of economic variables
as well. Technical improvements are embodied in new machines. Their adoption allows
productivity gains. The latter are a®ected by technological learning activities and occur
both internally and externally to the single ¯rm. In turn, the dynamics of individual vari-
able costs depends on the gap between ¯rm's productivity levels and the average variable
3cost prevailing in the market: ¯rms with above-average productivity will have coeteris
paribus lower costs, higher cash-°ows, and will be able to bear in better way the risks of
bankruptcy.
As mentioned, our model is well in the spirit of the \Agent-Based Computational Eco-
nomics" approach (see e.g Testfatsion, 1997; Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Fagiolo and Dosi,
2003; Fagiolo, Dosi, and Gabriele, 2004), and heavily builds on Delli Gatti et al. (2005).
Agent-based models have been developed to study the properties of systems characterized
by a large number of heterogeneous interacting units. In these models, microfoundations
are valued as reliable on the grounds of the empirical evidence they can account for, not
necessarily on their coherence with optimizing principles. In line with ACE building blocks,
the structure of our model allows for interactions among ¯rms, both in the form of network
externalities and through direct-price e®ects. While the former characterize learning activ-
ities performed on new technologies, the latter are embodied in labour and credit market
variables. Together, they concur to determine competition and the ensuing selection of
¯rms operating in the economy.
Simulation results show that the model is able to generate self-sustaining growth char-
acterized by wide and persistent °uctuations in the time-series of aggregate output, invest-
ment, employment and productivity. Moreover, the statistical properties of the simulated
output-investment dynamics match those empirically observed at business-cycles frequen-
cies. Similarly, we are able to replicate the most important regularities characterizing
technology and employment dynamics. The model is also consistent with the main stylised
fact characterizing the cross-sectional dynamics of productivity, i.e. productivity levels
of ¯rms display a signi¯cant and persistent dispersion. Finally, our simulated data can
replicate the most important productivity-growth and productivity-exit relations that we
observe in reality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
discusses qualitative and quantitative results of simulation exercises. Section 4 concludes
and presents some future developments.
2 The Model
2.1 The Economy
Consider an economy with a homogenous good in which ¯rms, labeled by the index i =
1;2;:::;N, undertake decisions at discrete times t = 1;2;:::;T. In each period production
4is carried out using capital and labour, under a Leontief technology:
Yit = minfKit;®itLitg; (1)
where Kit and Lit are respectively capital and labour employed, and ®it is the productivity
of labour.
The output produced by each ¯rm is fully sold on the market at the price Pit. Therefore,
we exclude the possibility of inventories accumulation. The relative price of ¯rm's output
is given by:
Pit = Ptuit; (2)
where Pt is the general price level and uit is the relative price for the output of the single
¯rm. We assume that uit is a random variable, uniformly distributed and independent on
Pt (see also below).
In any period each ¯rm is endowed with a level of real net worth, Ait, which is de¯ned
as the stock of ¯rm's assets in real terms that has been ¯nanced either through net pro¯ts
or through equity issues. We assume that information asymmetries in capital markets are
such that ¯rms cannot gather funds through new equity issues. Accordingly, net worth can
grow only through net pro¯ts and its dynamics reads:
Ait = Ait¡1 + ¼it¡1: (3)
The equity-rationing hypothesis implies that the unique source of external ¯nancing is
represented by debt supplied by ¯nancial intermediaries, Bit. In any period each ¯rm pays
a real interest rate equal to rit for the funds it borrows. For simplicity, we assume that the
latter is also the return on real net worth. Accordingly, ¯rm's ¯nancing costs are equal to:
rit(Ait + Bit) = ritKit: (4)
Variable costs are borne after production takes place. In addition, we assume that total
variable costs of capital are proportional to ¯nancing costs. The equation of net pro¯ts in









where wt is the real wage-rate and ¹it is a variable which takes value ¹n when replacement
occurs and ¹o otherwise (with ¹n > ¹o and ¹o > 1).
We give now a brief account of the timing of events occurring in any period. Next, we
5describe in more detail each event separately.
2.2 Dynamics
At the beginning of each period t, the system is completely described by the vectors
containing the state variables of our N ¯rms. Each vector includes time t ¡ 1 levels of
net worth, production, net pro¯ts, capital stock, the stock of debt and the technological
variables determining the productivity of the ¯rm, i.e. the vintage of its capital stock and
the skill with which it masters its embodied technology.
In each period ¯rms must take two types of decisions: they must set the level of ¯nal
output to be produced and sold, and they must decide whether to replace or not their
capital stock with a new and more productive vintage. The sequence of events occurring
in each period runs as follows:
1. Firms' net worth are updated: past net pro¯ts (positive or negative) are added to
the past level of net worth.
2. The innovation process takes place. New vintages are introduced under an exogenous
stochastic process.
3. The entry-exit process occurs.
4. Firms decide whether to switch or not to the new technology.
5. Labour and credit markets open: the wage-rate and the interest rates on loans are
determined. Firms' unitary costs are determined.
6. The level of production is set. The corresponding labour and capital demand decisions
are made.
7. Firms' production and replacement plans are realized.
8. The market for the ¯nal good opens. The relative prices for ¯rms' output are drawn.
9. Firms' pro¯ts are determined.
62.3 Technological Progress
The introduction of new vintages in the economy follows a Poisson process with exogenous
arrival rate ¸ > 0. Accordingly, the period of arrival of new capital-embodied technologies,
¿, is drawn from an exponential distribution with mean 1=¸. Whenever an innovation
occurs, the productivity µ increases at an exogenous rate » > 0. Therefore:
µ(¿) = µ0(1 + »)
¿, µ0 > 0: (6)
The actual productivity realized by a ¯rm with a given vintage, ®(¿), is the product of
the value given by (6) and the skill with which the ¯rm masters the technology embodied
in that vintage. The latter evolves, in turn, through learning activities, which are both
internal and external to the ¯rm. Let us denote with sit 2 [0;1] the internal skill level
achieved by ¯rm i on its operating vintage vit. Internal learning on the technology embodied




)sit¡1(1 ¡ sit¡1) (7)
where CUt¡1 and CCUt¡1 are respectively capacity utilization (i.e. the ratio of production
to capital stock) and cumulative capacity utilization realized with the operating vintage1.
The skill reached by each single ¯rm spills over and becomes available to the rest of
the economy. Let us denote with ¹ st(¿) the average skill achieved with vintage v(¿). We
assume that in each period the technological externality on a given vintage is proportional
to the average skill:
s
p
t(¿) = !¹ st(¿); with ! > 0 and s
p
¿(¿) = ´ > 0: (8)
Firms get the skill level s
p
t(¿) even if they do not currently own the vintage v(¿).
2.4 Entry-Exit
Firms exit the market whenever they go bankrupt, i.e. if their net worth becomes negative.
From (2), (3) and (5), it follows that bankruptcy occurs if the relative price for ¯rm's output
is such to lead to losses greater than the present level of net worth. We can de¯ne this price
level as the \reservation price" for ¯rm i in period t. Formally, it satis¯es the following
condition:
1In this fashion, internal skill dynamics acquires the features of the classic power law learning curves,
whose presence has often been reported in the literature on technology di®usion (see Dosi, Silverberg, and
Orsenigo, 1988).
7uit : Ait(uit) ´ 0: (9)
Bankruptcy is costly for ¯rms. Following Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), we assume




Each exiting ¯rm is replaced by a new entrant ¯rm. Therefore, the number of ¯rms
keeps constant through time. Furthermore, in order to avoid as much as possible biases
to the overall dynamics, we assume that entrant ¯rms are random copies of surviving ones
with respect to levels of net worth, capital stock, production and initial debt. As far as
technology is concerned, we suppose that the technology of any entrant ¯rm is chosen at
random between the most productive available and the one immediately following it.
2.5 Replacement Decisions
Replacement investment leads to an initial loss of production, equal to ¾itKit, where ¾it =
¾ < 1 if replacement occurs and zero otherwise. These losses can be due, for example, to
the deployment of part of labour force to tasks needed to bring the new vintage to operate
at full productivity.
In deciding whether replacing or not the capital stock Ks
it¡1 with a new vintage, each
¯rm compares the expected rate of pro¯ts in the two alternatives2. However, since replace-
ment is costly, it can also raise the risk of bankruptcy, i.e. the probability that the ¯rm's
output price falls below the threshold ¹ uit. We assume that, when comparing the outcomes
of the two alternatives, ¯rms take into consideration also the expected unitary bankruptcy
costs involved. If we denote respectively with ¹ uit(¾;®(¿);¹n;ait) and ¹ uit(0;®it;¹o;ait) the
reservation prices in case of replacement and no replacement, then from (5) and (10), it
follows that the pay-o® of the ¯rm in case of replacement is:

















2Throughout the paper we assume that the replacement decision has a discrete form: either the ¯rm
replaces all its capital stock or it does not replace at all. In addition, new vintages are e®ective with one
lag, i.e. once the capital stock has been replaced the new vintage becomes operative only after one period.
Finally, there is no resale market for the scrapped capital stock.
8where prf¢g stands for probability.
A ¯rm will replace its capital stock with a new vintage if the pay-o® in that case is












The product ¢prf ¢cKs
it¡1 measures the variation in expected bankruptcy risk induced by
replacement, where cKs
it¡1 is the cost of bankruptcy and ¢prf is the variation in bankruptcy
risk caused by the decision of adopting a new vintage. More formally:
¢pr
f = prfuit · ¹ uit (¾;®(¿);¹
n;ait)g ¡ prfuit · ¹ uit (0;®it;¹
o;ait)g: (14)
The rule in (13) simply states that a ¯rm replaces its capital stock whenever savings
on unitary real labour costs allowed by the new vintage (the L.H.S.) are greater or equal
than the unitary costs of replacement (the R.H.S.), which include also a premium for the
variation in bankruptcy risk caused by the replacement decision.
As far as uncertainty about technological parameters in (13) is concerned, we assume
for simplicity that the subjective probability distribution of the relative price uit is the
same for all ¯rms, and equal to the objective probability distribution, with E(uit) = 1.
In addition, we suppose that relative prices are drawn from a uniform distribution with
support (°;2 ¡ °). The foregoing assumptions imply that the expression for the risk























Each ¯rm sets its desired level of production through the maximization of expected net
pro¯ts minus expected bankruptcy costs. Formally, the problem of the ¯rm can be stated





it) ¡ prfuit · ¹ uit (¾it;®it;¹it;ait)g ¢ CFit: (16)
The de¯nitions of reservation price and net pro¯ts (Eqs. (9) and (5)), combined with the
assumptions on the probability distribution of the relative price uit and on the bankruptcy
9costs (Eq. (10)), imply that:
prfuit · ¹ uitg ¢ CFit =
c











Accordingly, the objective function to be maximized takes the form:
·


















>From ¯rst order conditions, the optimal level of production, Y ¤




(1 ¡ ¾it)(1 ¡ °)
c
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Equation (19) simply states that the optimal level of production of ¯rm i in period t is an
increasing function of its expected net pro¯tability (as captured by the mark-up expression
in square brackets), and an increasing function of its ¯nancial robustness (as measured by
the net worth Ait).
The assumptions on the technology of the ¯rms (see Eq. (1)), imply that the optimal
level of production Y ¤
it maps into a desired level for the capital stock in period t, Ks
it. More
precisely, we assume that net investment, i.e. additions to ¯rm's capital stock, occurs
whenever the optimal level of production is greater than the total capacity of the ¯rm, the
latter being measured by ¯rm's capital stock at the end of the previous period (Ks
it¡1).
Conversely, when optimal production is less than ¯rm's capital stock, net investment is
zero and total capacity is reduced by a constant fraction ± 2 (0;1). It follows that the law























2.7 The Labour Market
We study an economy characterized by an in¯nite supply of labour. Accordingly, output





The wage-bargaining process is not modelled in detail. We simply assume that in any
10period the wage-rate is proportional to the average productivity in the economy:
wt = Á®t; Á > 0: (22)
2.8 The Credit Market
To close the model, we suppose that the credit market is composed of ¯nancial intermedi-
aries, which take into account the risks of default in setting the clauses of the debt contract
they o®er to ¯rms. We assume away the possibility of credit rationing. Therefore, ¯rms
can borrow as many funds as they wish at the interest rate set by the banks. The interest
rate on debt contracts is equal to an exogenous level, r, plus a risk premium, which has
two components: the ¯rst accounts for the \¯nancial fragility" of the system, the second
captures the relative riskiness of the single borrowing ¯rm:
rit = r[1 + ½g(a(t)) + (1 ¡ ½)f(amax(t) ¡ ait)]; g
0(:) < 0;f
0(:) > 0;½ > 0 (23)
where a(t) is the economy's average equity ratio (i.e. the ratio of net worth to capital
stock), ait is ¯rm equity ratio, and amax(t) is the highest equity ratio in the economy at
time t.
2.9 A Risk-Based Approach to Replacement and Production De-
cisions: A Discussion
The framework exposed in the foregoing paragraphs aims at describing micro and macro
phenomena on the grounds of the interactions between ¯nancial and technological variables.
The e®ects of these interactions on ¯rms' exit, competition and growth drive the outcomes
of our model. Here, we brie°y discuss these mechanisms before presenting the results of
our analysis.
The economy under study features an inverse relation between ¯rm ¯nancial robust-
ness and ¯rm probability of bankruptcy. Firms care about the risk of bankruptcy in every
decision they make. In addition, equity rationing hampers them from washing away com-
pletely that risk. Thus, measures of ¯rm ¯nancial robustness (net worth and equity ratio)
enter directly in ¯rm decisions about replacement and production (see respectively (13)
and (16)).
By assumption, production goes always sold out in the output market. Accordingly,
¯rm growth dynamics is driven by the decisions about how much output to produce. The
latter are in turn determined by the expected risk of bankruptcy and by the dynamics of
11¯rm costs (see (16)). As mentioned, bankruptcy risks are inversely related to the ¯nancial
robustness of the ¯rm. The same is true for the cost of capital. Indeed, the interest
rate rule in (23) implies that ¯rms are ranked by banks according to their relative ¯nancial
conditions. As a consequence, ¯rms ¯nancially more (less) robust will pay, coeteris paribus,
lower (higher) interest rates for the funds they borrow. Moreover, an increase in the
economy-wide \¯nancial fragility", as re°ected by a reduction of the average equity ratio
in the economy, maps, other things being equal, into higher interest rates for all ¯rms
operating in the market3.
As far as labour cost is concerned, equation (22) states that labour cost inside the ¯rm
depends on ¯rm's relative productivity with respect to the average level in the economy.
Firms with productivity above (below) average have unitary labour costs which are below
(above) average. This implies unitary expected pro¯ts above (below) the mean. Never-
theless, such an advantage is temporary, because it vanishes as new technologies spread
throughout the economy. In this fashion, learning is coupled in the model with other
key features (appropriability of innovations, market interactions) characterizing empirical
dynamics of productivity at the micro level.
As a result, technological variables in°uence competition among ¯rms and growth by
determining productivity levels in the economy. On the one hand, both the vintage that
each ¯rm owns and the skill with which it masters its embodied technology determine its
productivity level and, consequently, the magnitude of the relative advantage in labour cost.
On the other hand, the speed of learning and di®usion, and the magnitude of technological
spill-overs in°uence the duration of the cost advantage. Financial variables, in turn, play
a key role for the productivity dynamics of the single ¯rm. The ability to a®ord more
productive vintages through replacement (see (13)) and to grasp the productivity gains
allowed by them (see (7)) will depend on the degree of ¯nancial robustness of the ¯rm.
Finally, the model features a mapping from the space of technological variables to
the one of ¯nancial variables. Equation (22) implies that both the dynamics of unitary
labour cost inside the ¯rm, and the corresponding one for net pro¯ts, depend on the ratio
between individual and average productivity. Firms more productive than the average will
have coeteris paribus lower unitary variable costs. This will map into a better ability to
absorb the impact of output price shocks. In other words, the e®ect of a negative (positive)
demand shock will be dampened (reinforced) if real variable costs are lower. This will lead
to an improvement (worsening) of the ¯nancial conditions of the ¯rm, with a consequent
3There are many institutional settings for the credit market that lead to the rule stated in (23).
For a survey on the working of credit markets under asymmetric information (and of its consequences
for aggregate performance) see Greenwald and Stiglitz (2001). For an empirical investigation on the
importance of ¯rm ¯nancial conditions for credit contract clauses see Strahan (1999) and Hubbard, Kuttner,
and Palia (1999).
12higher (lower) probability of survival and future growth.
3 Simulation Results
In this Section, we report the results of Monte-Carlo simulation exercises carried out on
the model presented in Section 24. All simulations refer to a benchmark parameter setup
(see Table 1) and homogeneous across-¯rm initial conditions (see Table 2)5. Homogeneity
of initial conditions was assumed in order not to bias the subsequent micro- and macro-
dynamics, and to better appreciate the emergence of heterogeneous across-¯rm micro-
patterns.
For the sake of convenience, we employed in our simulations a linear form for the
interest-rate rule introduced in (23):
rit = r[1 + ½a(t) + (1 ¡ ½)(amax(t) ¡ ait)] (24)
Moreover, entrants' technologies were drawn from a discrete uniform distribution.
We analyze simulated data from both a time-series and a cross-section perspective.
From a time-series (macro) point of view, we are interested in assessing whether our ag-
gregate series (output, investment, etc.) match empirically-observed business-cycle regu-
larities.
>From a cross-section (micro) point of view, we want to understand if the model is able
to replicate the most important stylised facts highlighted by the industrial dynamics liter-
ature (e.g., the properties of ¯rm growth and productivity dynamics; see also below). To
this end, we study the behaviour of the model after the system has relaxed to a su±ciently
stable dynamical pattern, which typically happens { for our benchmark setup { around
T = 10006.
In Section 3.1, we begin by presenting a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the
macro-dynamics. Next, in Section 3.2, we turn to describe the features of the micro-
dynamics of ¯rm growth and productivity.
3.1 Macro-Dynamics
In this Section we study whether our simulated macroeconomic time series feature sta-
tistical properties similar to the empirically observed ones. We begin by assessing if the
4The simulation code (written in C++) is available from the authors upon request.
5All results presented below are reasonably robust to changes of the parameter setup and initial con-
ditions in a fairly large neighborhood of our benchmarks. For a discussion, cf. Section 4.
6More precisely, this time-span allows for the convergence of recursive moments of all statistics of
interest.
13basic fact of modern capitalist economies, i.e. the emergence of self-sustaining growth, is
displayed by our macro time series.
Next, we turn to an analysis of the properties of simulated aggregate variables at
medium, business-cycle frequencies. In particular, we apply a band-pass ¯lter (Baxter and
King, 1999) to eliminate both low and high frequencies in the data. We then investigate
the patterns of output volatility and output-investment relation. Recent empirical evidence
has indeed documented the presence of signi¯cant changes in the volatility of aggregate
output within countries (see e.g. McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000; Stock and Watson,
2002). Moreover, aggregate investment is more variable than output, and appears to
be characterized by strong pro-cyclicality, with its movements being slightly coincident
with the ones of output (Agresti and Mojon, 2001; Stock and Watson, 1999; Napoletano,
Roventini, and Sapio, 2004).
Finally, we study whether technological shocks play any role in generating business
cycles in our model. The relation between technological shocks and business cycles has
been the object of a long debate over the last decades. Theoretical contributions have
highlighted many di®erent ways through which technical advances can impact on economic
°uctuations at medium frequencies (Prescott, 1986; Kydland and Prescott, 1982; King and
Rebelo, 1999). Nevertheless, empirical evidence accumulated so far has mostly rejected the
hypothesis of technology-generated business cycles (see e.g. Galµ ³, 1999; Forni and Reichlin,
1998; Jovanovic and Lach, 1997; Ramey and Francis, 2003). The impact of technology on
main macroeconomic time series, if any, is too delayed in time to be relevant at business
cycle frequencies7.
3.1.1 Long-Run Properties
As Figure 1 shows, self-sustaining growth characterized by °uctuations robustly emerges in
simulated aggregate output series. The same qualitative pattern is displayed by aggregate
investment and employment series (not shown). Average productivity is characterized by
long-run exponential growth as well (cf. Figure 2). Notice that technological improvements
play a key role in productivity dynamics. Indeed, the trend of average productivity closely
follows the one of the notional productivity of best vintages.
The qualitative results about the emergence of long-run growth are con¯rmed by a more
quantitative analysis. The ¯rst two rows in Table 3 report Dickey-Fuller tests (with a drift
in the null model) performed on the logarithms of our simulated macro series. Signi¯cance
7For example, Forni and Reichlin (1998) ¯nd that, although technological shocks account for half of
the total variance of output, they cannot explain its dynamics at business cycle frequencies. Likewise,
Jovanovic and Lach (1997) ¯nd that the di®usion of product innovations (i.e. technological shocks) has a
huge impact on the level of output, but underpredicts output movements over the business cycle.
14levels of the tests (in parentheses) clearly indicate that it is not possible to reject the null
hypothesis of at least one unit root.
3.1.2 Business Cycle Dynamics
To analyze the properties of macroeconomic dynamics at business cycle frequencies, we
applied a bandpass ¯lter to our series8. Through this procedure, stochastic trends were
removed (see the third and fourth rows in Table 3) and business cycle frequencies were
isolated.
As Figure 3 displays, the behaviour of aggregate output at business cycle frequencies is
qualitatively close to the empirically-observed one: wide °uctuations and volatility clusters
emerge. In addition, the auto-correlation structure of output displays the typical decaying
pattern observed in actual time series (cf. Table 4 and Figure 6).
As far as the output-investment relation is concerned, simulations indicate that the
series of aggregate investment is much more volatile than the series of output (see Fig. 4,
top-panel, and last row in Table 3). Moreover, aggregate investment is characterized by
a pro-cyclical and leading behaviour with respect to output (see Figure 5, mid-left panel,
and the investment column in Table 4).
Our analysis suggests that technological shocks play a secondary role in driving the
business cycle. As a direct evidence of this proposition, Figure 7 reports cross-correlation
coe±cients between technological shocks at lead zero and aggregate output at positive
leads9. The ¯gure shows that the impact of technological shocks on output is very weak at
business cycles frequencies, even at the farthest leads considered. The same result holds
for the other variables. The unique notable exception is represented by average labour
productivity (not shown), which is a®ected by technological shocks in a relevant way,
especially at nearest leads.
Additional evidence about the weak e®ect of technological shocks on economic °uctua-
tions at medium frequencies can be gathered by observing the coupled dynamics of output
and average labour productivity. Indeed, since average labour productivity is driven by
technological shocks (see discussion above), its behaviour with respect to output can be
taken as an indirect indicator of the in°uence of technological shocks on business cycles.
8We employed a bandpass ¯lter (6,32,50) in order to remove both highest and lowest frequencies in the
data while preserving those at business cycle dates. The window for the ¯lter (i.e. 6 to 32 periods) was
calibrated on the one chosen by Stock and Watson (1999) for their analysis of the U.S. cycle. Our large
simulated dataset allows us to adopt a higher level for the cut-o® parameter (50 periods). Nonetheless,
results at business cycle frequencies are robust to di®erent speci¯cations of the window and cut-o® para-
meters. For an analysis of the pros and cons of the use of band-pass ¯ltering in ACE models see Roventini,
Fagiolo, and Dosi (2004).
9Technological shocks are de¯ned as the change in the notional productivity of best vintages entailed
by the introduction of a new vintage.
15More precisely, if labour productivity had any e®ect on output, then its dynamics should
have been { at the very least { coincident with (or leading) the output one. However,
average labour productivity appears to be a pro-cyclical variable in our model, and its
movements are lagging output ones. The bulk of its cross-correlations with output is in-
deed concentrated between lag 4 and 6 (Figure 5, bottom-left panel).
Finally, changes in average ¯nancial conditions in the economy sensibly a®ect the be-
haviour of aggregate output during business cycles. The volatility of aggregate net worth
is indeed very close to the one of aggregate output (see Table 3). In addition, the dynam-
ics of aggregate net worth over the cycle closely follows the dynamics of output (see the
corresponding columns in Table 4 and Figure 5, bottom-right panel).
In summary, the coupled dynamics of ¯nancial and technological variables appears to
be characterized by many qualitative and quantitative properties that are also displayed
by empirical data, both in the long-run and at medium range, business-cycle frequencies.
Changes in the average ¯nancial conditions in the economy emerge as the major cause of
short-run °uctuations. In particular, movements in aggregate net worth appear to pro-
mote, ¯rst, changes in aggregate output and employment, and, subsequently, in aggregate
investment and average productivity (Figure 5). Conversely, at business cycle frequencies
the impact of technological shocks on the ¯rst moments of the distributions of ¯nancial
and real variables is on average rather weak.
3.2 Micro-Dynamics
In recent years, a lot of e®ort has been devoted to the study of the statistical properties
of ¯rm growth and productivity dynamics. For example, the properties of ¯rm growth
dynamics have been tested against the benchmark hypothesis of randomness represented
by the so-called \Gibrat's Law" (GL), which basically states the independence of ¯rm
growth from its size. A consistent amount of evidence has been produced against this law
(Lee et al., 1998; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003a). The statistical properties of ¯rm size and
growth distributions seem to signi¯cantly depart from the log-normal benchmark implied by
the GL. On the other hand, a recent body of empirical research performed on longitudinal
micro data sets has revealed that the process of productivity growth at the micro level is
not as smooth as the one represented in more aggregate series (see Bartelsman and Doms,
2000, and references therein). In particular, the presence of signi¯cant and persistent
di®erences in productivity levels among ¯rms appears as the basic feature underlying the
dynamics of productivity in most sectors and countries. Moreover, productivity seems to
16have non trivial e®ects on ¯rm growth10. Indeed, ¯rm productivity appears to be positively
correlated with growth rates and exit probability.
In what follows, we will test whether ¯rm size and growth rate distributions generated
by our benchmark simulation are coherent with the implications of GL. Next, we will
investigate the properties of the coupled productivity-growth dynamics.
3.2.1 Statistical Properties of Pooled Size and Growth Distribution
In one of its most widely accepted interpretations, the GL (also known as \Law of Pro-
portionate E®ects") states that ¯rm growth is independent of ¯rm size. Accordingly, the
dynamics of ¯rm size, Sit can be formalized as follows:
Sit = Sit¡1Git (25)
where Git is a random variable. If git = log(Git) are i.i.d. random variables with ¯nite
mean and variance, then Sit is well approximated, for large t, by a log-normal distribution.
In addition, growth rates git = ¢log(Sit) are normally distributed. A recent strand of
empirical research has led to discard the implications arising from processes like the one
formalized in (25). More precisely, tent-shaped growth rates densities appear as a robust
feature both across sectors and at the aggregate level (Lee et al., 1998; Bottazzi and
Secchi, 2003a). At the same time, the shape of log ¯rm size densities is far from being well
approximated by a log normal distribution and displays a strong cross-sector heterogeneity
(Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003a).
Figure 8 shows the rank-size plot for the pooled simulated size distribution over the
whole time span considered in our analysis11. Notice how the size distribution can hardly
be approximated by a log-normal. In particular the mass of the distribution appears to
be considerably shifted to the right. Furthermore, pooled growth rate distributions depart
remarkably from the Gaussian benchmark. Indeed, as shown in Figure 9, growth rate
distributions are characterized by fat tails and are well approximated by a symmetric
Laplace density.
The foregoing evidence { departure from lognormality of ¯rm size distributions and
fat-tailed Laplace densities for ¯rm growth rates { reveals that the simulated process of
¯rm growth does not follow the Gibrat's dynamics formalized in (25), but closely matches
the empirically-observed stylised facts.
10See Bottazzi, Ce¯s, and Dosi (2002) for a more skeptical view about the presence of the productivity-
growth relation in Italian data.
11The size measure considered was the output level Yit. Alternative measures of size (e.g., employment)
produced the same results. The size measure considered was then depurated by years averages in order to
remove time-trends in the moments of the distributions.
17Notice that this result is due, in the model, to the interplay between two crucial factors.
On the one hand, repeated interactions among heterogeneous ¯rms generate, as mentioned
above, an unequal distribution of growth opportunities in the market. On the other hand,
the existence of dynamic increasing returns in credit and labour markets implies that
growth opportunities in a given time span will mostly concentrate in a few ¯rms, which
will then display higher growth rates. This feature leads, in turn, to the emergence of
leptokurtic densities of ¯rm growth rates12. In the credit market, for example, ¯rms who
are more (less) ¯nancially robust will have higher (lower) unitary cost on capital. This
implies a higher probability of having better (worse) ¯nancial conditions in next periods.
Likewise, in the labour market ¯rms who are more (less) productive (than the mean) have
lower (higher) labour costs, and this maps in a higher chance of having better (worse)
¯nancial conditions in next periods. This may drive subsequent learning, a more e®ective
technological adoption, and higher productivity.
3.2.2 Productivity Dynamics and the Evolution of the Productivity-Growth
Relation
The presence of heterogeneity in ¯rm productivity levels appears as a robust pattern char-
acterizing the micro data in our benchmark simulations. Indeed, as Figure 10 shows, the
standard deviation of productivity is positive and characterized by an exponential trend.
Hence, asymmetries in the evolution of ¯nancial variables map in di®erent abilities of catch-
ing the opportunities o®ered by new technologies. Indeed, ¯rms which are more ¯nancially
robust increasingly perform replacement investment and technological learning.
Productivity patterns are also characterized by a persistent heterogeneity among ¯rms.
Tables 5 and 6 show the average (forward and backward) productivity transition matrices
over 20 periods13. More precisely, each row in Table 5 displays the average fractions of
¯rms who were in a given quintile of the productivity distribution at the beginning of a
twenty period interval and moved to each quintile of the distribution at the end of the
interval. Each row in Table 6 shows instead the average fractions of ¯rms in a given
quintile of the productivity distribution at the end of a twenty period interval that come
12For a similar interpretation, cf. the \island-models" of ¯rm growth (see e.g. Sutton, 1997; Ijiri and
Simon, 1977; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003b). In particular, Bottazzi and Secchi (2003b) show that, under
very general conditions, Laplace densities emerge as long as the growth process features an asymmetric
distribution of ¯nite growth opportunities among ¯rms and dynamic increasing returns in the technology
of opportunities assignment.
13We split the whole time-span analyzed in equally longer intervals of twenty periods, and for each of
them we computed the transition matrices of productivity of ¯rms that were present both at the beginning
and at the end of the interval considered. Tables 5 and 6 report the average transition values together
with their standard deviations.
18from each quintile of the distribution at the beginning of the interval14. The fact that the
two matrices are very similar indicates a strong persistence of productivity di®erences in
our sample.
Finally, we investigate the properties of productivity-growth and productivity-exit cor-
relations. As mentioned, empirical evidence shows that more (less) productive ¯rms are
characterized by higher (lower) growth, and by a lower (higher) probability of exit. As
Figure 11 indicates, both patterns emerge as quite robust properties in our model.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented an agent-based model which attempts to investigate
how the coupled dynamics between ¯nancial variables and technological shocks shapes the
aggregate dynamics of economies populated by heterogeneous agents. A key feature of
the model is its bottom-up approach to the microfoundation of macroeconomic relations.
We studied the extent to which the model was able to reproduce empirical properties
characterizing aggregate time-series and cross-sectional dynamics.
Simulation results indicate that the adjustment to technology and demand shocks of
heterogenous, myopic, ¯rms that take into account the risk of bankruptcy in their deci-
sions, allows for self-sustaining patterns of growth and business-cycle °uctuations in out-
put, investment, productivity and employment. The statistical properties of the output-
investment relation match, at business-cycle frequencies, those observed in reality. The
same holds for other time-series, e.g. technological shocks. Changes to net worth distri-
bution emerge as the major source of short-run °uctuations in the model. Conversely,
the e®ect of technological shocks on the ¯rst moments of the distribution of the main
macroeconomic time-series appears to be weak.
Our model is also able to reproduce the main stylised facts of ¯rm growth and produc-
tivity dynamics. Indeed, the statistical features of ¯rm size and growth rate distributions
depart signi¯cantly from the \Gibrat's Law" benchmark. In particular, size distributions
are more skewed to the right than log normal ones, whereas growth rate densities display
excess kurtosis, with a shape well approximated by a symmetric Laplace density.
The productivity picture in our benchmark simulation is characterized by the presence
of huge and persistent asymmetries in productivity levels among ¯rms. Furthermore, a
positive correlation between productivity and growth, and a negative one between produc-
14For example, cell (2,3) in Table 5 reports the average fraction of ¯rms who were in the second quintile
at the beginning of a twenty-period interval and moved to the third quintile at the end of the interval.
Similarly, cell (2,3) in Table 6 reports the average fraction of ¯rms who ended up in quintile 2 at the end
of a twenty-period interval and were in quintile 3 at the beginning of the interval.
19tivity and exit, emerge as distinctive attributes of our benchmark setup.
The foregoing ¯ndings should be tested against a deeper Monte-Carlo exploration of the
parameter space. More precisely, one could study to what extent our results are modi¯ed
when system parameters are varied across suitable intervals. For example, the consequences
of changes in the interest rate for output, investment and employment dynamics could be
investigated. Similarly, one could experiment the impact of alternative settings for labour
and credit markets, as well as the e®ect of di®erent entry-regimes (Geroski, 1995).
Furthermore, a more detailed investigation of the linkages between micro- and macro-
dynamics is required. Two research questions seem to be particularly interesting. First,
the time-evolution of cross-section distributions could be more carefully spelled out. In
this way, one might address the issue whether micro-patterns change during the di®usion
of a new technology. Second, the exploration of the impact of micro-dynamics on aggregate
variables should not be con¯ned { as we have done above { to averages only. For example,
one could study whether technological shocks a®ect higher moments (e.g., variance) of
output and investment series.
Finally, one might attempt to investigate the consequences of introducing more stringent
bounds to agents' rationality (e.g., in the way ¯rms form expectations about technology
and prices and/or in the way they make choices under uncertainty). For instance, one
could study the implications of injecting in the economy agents embedding the axioms of
Prospect Theory (see e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Camerer, Lowenstein, and Rabin,
2004) or, alternatively, agents behaving in more evolutionary, routinized ways (Fagiolo and
Dosi, 2003).
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23Description Symbol Value
Number of Firms N 250
Arrival Rate ¸ 0.025
Unitary Increment » 0.200
Speed of Learning ¯ 0.500
Cost w/o Replacement ¹o 1.500
Cost w/ Replacement ¹n 2.500
Loss on Production due to Replacement ¾ 0.050
Learning Spill-Overs ! 0.330
Initial Skill on New Technologies ´ 0.200
Wage/Productivity Ratio Á 0.700
Exogenous Interest Rate r 0.053
Risk-Premium Coe±cient ½ 0.500
Reduction of Capital Stock ± 0.025
Support of Price Distribution ° 0.250
Table 1: Benchmark Parametrization.
Description Symbol Value
Initial Net Worth A(0) 20
Initial Capital Stock K(0) 100
Initial Debt B(0) 80
Initial Production Y (0) 100
Productivity of First Vintage µ(0) 1.5
Initial Interest Rate r(0) 0.053
Table 2: Initial Conditions.
Output Aggr.Inv. Empl. Avg.Prod. Net Worth
DF Test (logs) -0.475 -1.173 -0.468 5.148 -0.474
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
DF Test (Bpf) -5.360 -8.096 -6.066 -5.433 -5.461
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Std.Dev. (Bpf) 0.356 1.616 0.430 0.018 0.358
Rel. Std. Dev. 1.000 4.543 1.210 0.051 1.008
Table 3: First two rows: Dickey-Fuller Tests for Log of Output (¯rst row) and Band-
Pass Filtered (6,32,50) Output Series. Signi¯cance levels in parentheses. Third Row:
Standard Deviations of Band-Pass Filtered (6,32,50) Output Series. Fourth Row: Standard
Deviations Relative to Band-Pass Filtered (6,32,50) Output Series.
24Output Leads Output Aggr.Inv. Empl. Avg.Prod. Net Worth
-6 -0.221 -0.239 -0.211 0.416 -0.194
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-5 -0.087 -0.252 -0.085 0.312 -0.058
(0.034) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.141)
-4 0.117 -0.248 0.103 0.174 0.142
(0.003) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000)
-3 0.385 -0.192 0.359 0.031 0.409
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.435) (0.000)
-2 0.678 -0.053 0.638 -0.093 0.696
(0.000) (0.183) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000)
-1 0.911 0.163 0.854 -0.185 0.917
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0 1.000 0.396 0.924 -0.242 0.990
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1 0.911 0.562 0.821 -0.266 0.886
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2 0.678 0.594 0.586 -0.263 0.642
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3 0.385 0.484 0.309 -0.238 0.345
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
4 0.117 0.282 0.070 -0.199 0.078
(0.004) (0.000) (0.075) (0.000) (0.047)
5 -0.087 0.066 -0.096 -0.154 -0.116
(0.028) (0.096) (0.015) (0.000) (0.003)
6 -0.221 -0.098 -0.209 -0.111 -0.246
(0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Table 4: Cross-Correlations between Aggregate Variables at Lead Zero and Output at
various Leads and Lags. P-values in parentheses.
25Quintiles 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.3520 0.2148 0.1651 0.1388 0.1250
(-0.1258) (0.1106) (0.0967) (0.1156) (0.1367)
2 0.3252 0.2885 0.1691 0.1138 0.1009
(0.0943) (0.1253) (0.1112) (0.0839) (0.1210)
3 0.17202 0.34432 0.26494 0.13867 0.07949
(0.0855) (0.1452) (0.1433) (0.0936) (0.0925)
4 0.0964 0.1289 0.3426 0.3287 0.1026
(0.0596) (0.1286) (0.1612) (0.1771) (0.0837)
5 0.0553 0.0224 0.0577 0.2861 0.5753
(0.0432) (0.0345) (0.0802) (0.2003) (0.2583)
Table 5: Forward Productivity Transition Matrix. Time-series standard deviations in
parentheses. Each (h;k) entry represents the estimated average fraction of ¯rms that
belong at the beginning of a 20-period interval to the h-th quintile of the productivity
distribution and end up in the k-th quintile at the end of the interval.
Quintiles 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.3512 0.21427 0.1641 0.1374 0.1271
(0.1257) (0.1101) (0.0955) (0.1144) 0.1393
2 0.3255 0.2892 0.1700 0.1134 0.1034
(0.0932) (0.1262) (0.1132) (0.0836) (0.1246)
3 0.1721 0.3457 0.2644 0.1384 0.0810
(0.0855) (0.1476) (0.1409) (0.0939) (0.0939)
4 0.0961 0.1286 0.3436 0.3288 0.1047
(0.0587) (0.1283) (0.1636) (0.1793) (0.0852)
5 0.0544 0.0221 0.0577 0.2806 0.5747
(0.0428) (0.0348) (0.0821) (0.1984) (0.2580)
Table 6: Backward Productivity Transition Matrix. Time-series standard deviations in
parentheses. Each (h;k) entry represents the estimated average fraction of ¯rms that
belong at the end of a 20-period interval to the h-th quintile of the productivity distribution
and started in the k-th quintile at the beginning of the interval.































Figure 1: Output Time-Series.

















Not.Productivity of Best Vintages
Figure 2: Productivity Trend. Solid line: Average Productivity. Dashed Line: Notional
Productivity of Best Vintages.
















Figure 3: Band-Pass Filtered Aggregate Output.


































Figure 4: Output, Investment and Employment (Band-Pass Filtered) Time-Series. Top
Panel: Output vs. Aggregate Investment. Bottom Panel: Output vs. Aggregate Employ-
ment.




































































Figure 5: Output Correlation Structure. Cross-correlation between Aggregate Variables at
lead zero and output at various leads and lags (solid line). Dashed lines: con¯dence bands.
X-axis: leads of output. Band-Pass Filtered Series.





















Figure 6: Output Autocorrelation (solid
line). Dashed lines: con¯dence bands. X-
axis: leads of output. Band-Pass Filtered
Series.

















Figure 7: Technological Shocks and Ag-
gregate Output. Cross-correlation between
technology shocks at lead zero and output
at positive leads (solid line). Dashed lines:
con¯dence bands. X-axis: leads of output.
Band-Pass Filtered Series.


















Figure 8: Firm Size Distribution. Pooled Rank-Size Plot (solid line) vs. Log-Normal Fit
(dashed line).
















































































































































Figure 10: (Log of) Time-Series Productivity Standard Deviation.
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